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The rush of presidential candidates to the religious leaders   
Source: Landry Banga (nom de plume, RIC).  
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Abstract: Whereas Senegal has long been sold as a showcase of democracy in Africa, 
including peaceful political alternance, things apparently changed fundamentally with 
the Senegalese presidentials of 2019 that brought new configurations. One of the 
major issues was political side-switching that has been elevated to the rank of religion 
in defiance of morality. It threatened political stability and peace. In response, social 
networks of predominantly young activists, created in 2011 in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring focused on grass-roots advocacy with the electorate on good governance and 
democracy. They proposed a break with a political system that they consider as neo-
colonialist. Moreover, Senegal’s justice is frequently accused to be biased, and the 
servility of the Constitutional Council which is in the first place an electoral court has 
often been denounced.  
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1. The presidentials of 2019, a new political configuration demands its toll  
 
With two democratic transitions of political power and no coup since its independence in 
1960, Senegal has been considered one of the most stable countries in Africa up to date2Yet, 
the formerly shining example of democratic transition is actually immersed in corruption and 
muddy power politics (Dumont, 2019). Once a haven of peace, stability and democracy in 
Western Africa, that had never experienced any coup d'état, other than most of its West 
African ECOWAS neighbours, Senegal is now apparently endangered by severe political 
tensions. This the more so, because the incumbent, President Macky Sall, and his coalition 
Benno Bokk Yakkar (BBY, ‘united for the same hope’, in Wolof) won a second five-year term 
already in the first round of the contested presidential election of 24 February 2019. 
According to the provisional results, announced by the National Commission for the 
Recording of Votes (CNRV) on 28 February, confirmed by the Constitutional Council, he 
secured a crushing victory with 58% of votes, against 21% for his closest rival, former Prime 
Minister Idrissa Seck with his party Rewmi (‘the country’, in Wolof). The other contenders got 
even less: Ousmane Sonko with his party Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics and Fraternity 
(PASTEF) (16%), El-Hadj Issa Sall and his party Party of Unity and Assembly (PUR) (4%), 
and Madické Niang, the PDS dissident candidate and his coalition Jamm Ak Xeweul (‘peace 
in abundance’, in Wolof)-Madicke2019 that wanted to rally the voters of the PDS that were 
disappointed by the self-interested attitude of former PDS leader Abulaye Wade got just 1%.  
 
Graph 1: Results of Senegal’s presidentials 2019 
 
Source: “Macky Sall déclaré vainqueur de la présidentielle au Sénégal”  
London: BBC-Afrique, 28 February 2019  
 
Despite the call for a boycott of the elections (see below for details) by former president 
Abdoulaye Wade, the elevated turn-out of 66%, compared with 52% for the presidentials of 
                                                 
2 Since December1980, when the founding father of independent Senegal, Leopold Sedar Senghor, who had 
ruled the country for twenty years (1960 to 1980), resigned from his presidency prematurely before the end of his 
fifth term, seven pluralist elections have been taken place. In five of these polls, the incumbent president was re-
elected in the first round. At two occasions the incumbent had to bow to the second round which he lost.  
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2012 (first round) or 57% at the legislative elections of 2017, showed a relatively strong 
interest in these elections. However, because Macky Sall was accused of preventing some of 
his main rivals from running, the opposition got upset and even refused to contest the results 
before the Constitutional Council, which it apparently considered as biased in favour of the 
acting president (Diedhiou, 2019), as will been shown below in more detail. Idrissa Seck, the 
most important contender of Macky Sall, condemned the election and its results as a ‘result 
on the order of the outgoing candidate’ (Mbaye, 2019). 
 
The strive between the acting government and the opposition focused on two controversial 
issues. Firstly, a new electoral law, which had been approved by the Senegal Parliament in 
April 2018, stipulating that candidates had to require 53,000 signatures for qualifying for the 
presidency. Seven of the 27 candidates succeeded to get nationwide support in this 
"parrainage" process.  
 
 Macky Sall, the incumbent (57 years old) for the party Alliance for the Republic, seeking to 
extend his presidency for a second term,  
 Idrissa Seck (58 years old, party Rewmi), the former prime minister 
 El-Hadj Issa Sall (62 years old, Party of Unity and Assembly),  
 Ousmane Sonko, (Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics and Fraternity, PASTEF),  
 Madické Niang (65 years old, Independent),  
 Karim Wade (50 years old, Senegalese Democratic Party, PDS) and  
 Khalifa Sall (63 years old,  Socialist Party, PS), former mayor of Dakar and delegate of the 
National Assembly.  
 
Graph 2: Number and geographical distribution of polling stations  
 
 
Source: e-media.sn, 2 February 2019  
 
But even more essentially, the presidential candidates of the two most important political 
parties in the country’s political history, Karim Wade of the Senegalese Democratic Party 
(PDS) and Khalifa Sall of the Socialist Party (PS), were denied to candidate because of 
criminal charges against them. The Senegalese Constitutional Council decided on 20 
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January 2019, not to admit these two candidates, because they had been sentenced to 
prison terms of more than five years for corruption and "embezzlement of public funds" which 
disqualified them from candidature according to law. Thus, both Karim Wade, the son of the 
former President Abdoulaye Wade (PDS, 92 years old), and the popular former mayor of 
Dakar, Khalifa Sall were out of the game. Wade was unexpectedly pardoned by President 
Macky Sall in 2016 and fled into political exile in Qatar. Khalifa Sall had been relieved of 
office already as Dakar's mayor and Member of the National Assembly in 2017 (Volk, 2019). 
Many voters suspect these charges to be fabricated in order to keep Karim Wade and Khalifa 
Sall out of the game (Foot, 2019).  
 
Thus, the 11th Senegal presidential elections of 24 February 2019, when a total of 6,683,043 
registered voters out of Senegal's 15 million inhabitants were called to cast their vote in 
15,397 polling stations, in 6.919 polling districts, including 370 abroad, were characterized by 
a new political configuration. For the first time since independence, none of the major 
traditional parties threw its hat in the ring. Only four presidential contenders of the incumbent 
Macky Sall had been admitted for the polls. This, against fourteen challengers in 2012 and 
fifteen in 2007 and the background of a multitude of 65 political parties currently existing in 
Senegal (here and in the following, Ba, 2019). The Socialist Party (PS), that had been 
present at all polls since the independence of Senegal (1960), was outmanoeuvred by 
internal conflicts, most recently, the aforementioned case of the former mayor of Dakar, 
Khalifa Sall. The second big traditional party, the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) of 
Abdoulaye Wade and the Alliance of Forces for Progress (AFP) of Moustapha Niasse as well 
as the Front for Socialism and Democracy / Benno Jubël (FSD-BJ) of the Dièye family who 
all had run the polls since 2000 had to depart as well (Ba, 2019). Most of the PS and the AFP 
did not participate because they wanted to rally the presidential movement and empower the 
candidate Macky Sall.  
 
Graph 3: Geographical distribution of polling districts, Senegal, presidentials, 2019 
 
Source: e-media.sn, 2 February 2019  
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For the PDS and its leader, the former 92-year-old President Abdoulaye Wade, it was 
different. He wanted to make his son, Karim, the next head of state. When Karim’s 
candidature was rejected by the Constitutional Council, Wade called for a boycott of the 
elections. He even did not accept the candidature of Nadicke Niang as runner on the ticket of 
the PDS. This unparalleled situation suddenly erased the old political elite from the political 
landscape. This was, according to some factions involved, the quittance for years of bad 
governance and corruption, for others, however, it was the shabby foul-play of the actual 
power elite led by Macky Sall (Ba, 2019).  
 
The surprising rallying of the PDS later-on to the liberal camp under the Macky Sall regime 
seems to confirm the death of political ideology that had been predicted by political experts 
since the slowly crumbling political system since the 1980s. The latest political migrations 
within this power elite are a sign of unscrupulous and opportunistic political transhumance, 
for which Senegal became already famous internationally (Ba, 2019; NIang, 2013). 
 
 
2. When transhumance becomes religion  
 
Political transhumance, i.e. political nomadism from one party affiliation to another, 
depending on the attractiveness of ‘pastures’, has become so widespread in Senegal’s 
political history3 that it has been recognized already internationally, and even earned an entry 
in the French dictionary ‘Le Petit Larousse illustré’ (NIang, 2013). Although it is still chastised 
as betrayal and morally repugnant if it concerns the political adversary, in reality, political 
transhumance has become more and more commonplace. It does not bother anyone, last, 
but not least, because party programs are still considered as paper-waste by many voters, 
and political ideology, whether socialist, liberal or conservative, is said to be increasingly 
irrelevant. What counts most, besides the individual political history, experience and 
charisma of the respective candidate, are religious, regional and ethnic affiliation and assets 
promised to the particular clientele. According to Moustapha Tamba, professor of sociology 
at the University of Dakar, there are three main causes of political side-switching 
(transhumance), the lack of internal party democracy, unfulfilled promises and marabout 
orders (Tamba, 2011).  
In fact, ethnicity which is a major predictor of voting behaviour in many African countries like 
Benin or Mali, has little explanatory value in Senegal (just 11% according to Koter, 2016:7). 
Instead, Senegalese voters tend to support the candidate who promises the greatest material 
and economic improvements in their region, which – as a rule – is the incumbent. Thus, the 
vast majority of rural areas throughout Senegal changed their electoral allegiance according 
to this criterion. For example, Abdoulaye Wade had sparse support in the countryside when 
he still was a challenger, but as an incumbent, the rural areas voted overwhelmingly for him. 
This shift was so spectacular that between 2000 and 2012, Wade’s electorate changed its 
composition from a largely urban one to one dominated by rural voters. In some rural areas, 
the incumbent increased his support by over 50 % in a few years’ time (Koter, 2016:7). Even 
other social identities beside ethnic attachment, like religion and brotherhood affiliation 
                                                 
3
 The first case of parliamentary transhumance dates back to colonial times, when MP Ibrahima Seydou Ndao, 
elected on the list of the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS) in 1952, resigned from his party before the 
elections of March 1959, and joined the Party for Senegalese Solidarity (PPS) of Cheikh Tidiane Sy, thus 
becoming the first transhumant deputy in the political history of Senegal (Tamba, 2011, Fn.13). 
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respectively, do not have a similar strong predictive value (Koter, 2016:10), although the 
Muslim brotherhoods, notably the Mourids and Tidjanes, have been considered the grey 
eminences behind Senegal’s presidential candidates since independence (Beck, 2002; 
Monjib, 1998). Therefore, candidates run for ‘advice’ and support of their religious mentors 
(Banga, 2019). However, there exist remarkable difference in social structure and the role of 
local leaders in urban and rural areas. Koter (2016:10) showed that rural voters were much 
more dependent on their local leaders than urban voters. Consequently, the former were 
more likely to follow those leaders’ voting suggestions, as the latter. But since intermediaries 
tend to support the “richest” candidate, which in many African countries tends to be the 
incumbent president, the incumbents wins in rural areas by higher margins (Koter, 2016: 29). 
Consequently, political transhumance in Senegal has been elevated to the “rank of religion in 
defiance of morality” (Drame, 2012). Remarkably, this ‘transhumance as religion’ works 
apparently in both directions. Firstly, it refers to the active practice, even celebration of the 
‘religion of transhumance’, and secondly, it makes allusions to the political transhumance of 
religious traditional leaders. The latter, i. e. politico-religious transhumance, may be most 
dangerous for political stability and peace, notably, if rival religious leaders are involved, as 
happened already in the past (see below). 
“Since colonial times, the Islam of the Senegalese brotherhoods has always been very 
closely connected to politics. Therefore, any assumed difference between a ‘moderate' 
African Soufi-Islam and ‘radical’ political Arab Sunni Islam in this respect would be 
misleading” (here and in the following, Samson-Ndaw, 2009: 149-150). Moreover, new 
leaders within the Senegalese marabout-system, notably the Marabout, late Cheikh Ahmed 
Tidiane Sy, and the Mouride Modou Kara M’backé, had been actively engaged in the 
creation of religious-political spaces, coining a new type of ‘religious citizenship’. Thus, 
Cheikh Tidiane Sy was the first Senegalese from a large religious family to have created a 
political party. He had a difficult stance with his Marabou peers with the exception of a few, 
like Sheikh Ibrahim Niass who supported him (Ben, 2013). Cheikh Modou Kara M'Backé, 
founded a political party as well, the Truth for Development Party. Another religious leader 
within the muridiyya that had founded a political party was Cheikh Ibra Fall who created the 
Citizens' Movement for a Development Democracy (MDC). However, Cheikh Modou Kara 
M’backé was said to be the first to have created furthermore an important militia at the 
disposal of the brotherhood and his party (Dzon, 2010: 27). 
Graph 4: Distribution of Senegal’s Muslim population by brotherhood  
 
Source: S’installer au Sénégal, Repartition des confrèries musulmanes, 31 August 2013;  
Dumont et al, 2019: 36  
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The segmentation and aggregation of the Senegalese Muslim population, which accounts for 
90% of the population, around four brotherhoods and another four autonomous homes, 
under the aegis of certain families is unique in Western Africa. “Some brotherhoods are of 
Arab origin (Qadiriyya and Tidjaniya), others, like Layenes and Mouridism, are locally 
created. The brotherhoods each have their holy cities, their dignitaries and disciples”. 
(Dumont et al, 2019: 36). “Muridism is the second brotherhood numerically, after the 
Tidjanes, but probably the most dynamic economically, culturally and politically” (ibid). There 
are four brotherhoods and four autonomous homes of ‘divine’ Muslim families (Wane, 
2010:2): 
a.  The brotherhoods:  
i. Qadr: Kounta, in Ndiassane  
ii. Tijân: Sy, in Tivaouane  
iii. Layène: Thiaw in Cap-Vert   
iv. Mouride: Mbacké, in Baol at Touba and environments  
v.  
b. The autonomous homes of ‘holy’ families in the following regions:  
i. Centre: Kaolack with the family Niasse  
ii. South East: Madina Gounasse with the Bâ  
iii. Centre: Thiénaba with the Seck  
iv. North: Louga with the Sall  
Map 1: Centres of Senegalese Islam  
 
 
Source: Gueye, Cheik  - Recherche Institute for the development, Cartographic Service, Paris: IRD  
Dumont et al, 2019: 36 
The town of Touba, the home of the Mourides, about 200 km to the east of Dakar, is 
arguably the most important holy site to visit for any presidential candidate. The city in the 
Baol region, with about 600,000 people, is the second biggest town beside the capital Dakar. 
It is considered to be a stronghold of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) of former 
President Abdoulaye Wade, “who, contrary to his predecessor, openly affirmed his 
membership in the brotherhood of the Mourides” (Dumont et al 2019: 38). In fact, “he publicly 
declared that he was elected thanks to the support of the Mouridiya in 2000 and 2007” 
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(Guennoun, 2019.16). His son’s candidature for the presidency had been rejected by the 
Constitutional Council, which was probably the main reason behind his call for a boycott of 
the polls. Therefore, Madické Niang, the PDS dissident candidate, had chosen to come to 
Touba to try to seduce Abdoulaye Wade's Mouride electorate and its followers (Lesseux, 
2019). Nevertheless, the incumbent Macky Sall, who had tried to attract the sympathy of the 
Mourides by generous infrastructure projects during his past tenure, started his electoral 
campaign here as well and was received by the General Khalif of the Mourides-brotherhood, 
Serigne Mountakha Mbacké, the eighth Khalif of Mouridism4, on Sunday, 3 February 2019 
(Lesseux, 2019).  
Already before, on 14 November 2018, the outgoing president had paid a call of courtesy to 
Serigne Babacar Sy Mansour, the Kalif of the Tidianes in Tivaouane. On this occasion Macky 
Sall reiterate his commitment to the modernization of religious cities, what “he would be able 
to do only if he would be re-elected, i. e. if he would get the support of the first Confraternity 
of the country” (Guennoun, 2019:18). Moreover, both candidates, Macky Sall and Ousmane 
Sonko, were present at the annual holy celebrations of the two most important brotherhoods. 
Apparently, “Ousmane Sonko was favoured in Touba while President Macky Sall was 
favoured in Tivaouane. Indeed, during his visit to Touba, Ousmane Sonko made promises 
concerning actions in favour of the city as well” (Guennoun, 2019: 20). In fact, increased 
political competition may lead incumbents to adopt policies of economic incentives for their 
respective fiefs that may carry short-term electoral gains but arguably at the expense of 
longer term development goals (Gottlieb et al, 2019). The other presidential candidates 
called for support in their respective strongholds too. Idrissa Seck for example, called for 
support in his fief of Thies, Ousmane Sonko and Issa Sall had chosen the capital Dakar for 
the launch of their electoral campaign across the country (Tambedou & Fall, 2019). 
This time, the Great Khalif of the Mourides did not emit a "Ndigueul", i.e. a formal call to vote 
for one of the candidates, although this happened already in the past (Tambedou & Fall, 
2019). Apart from President Abdoulaye Wade, the head of the Mouride-brotherhood had also 
called to vote for Abdou Diouf in the past (Guennoun, 2019:17; Dumont et al 2019: 37). But 
even if the religious leaders decided to remain silent in public, that does not necessarily 
mean that their followers did not get informal signs for whom to vote. These may be as 
binding as a formal recommendation, considering that for many believers their religious 
guides are more important than politicians (Guennoun, 2019:16). In short, what the marabout 
says, that is done, at least for a true believer (Tambedou & Fall, 2019).  
 
In Senegal’s history, the leaders of religio-political parties did not separate any more religious 
and socio-political life. Their political battlefield included the creation of radical conservative 
‘Muslim patriots’ and the Islamization of the state ‘from below’. The latter included a sharp 
critic of the unreligious and noxious life, degenerated by the impact of Western globalization, 
notably in contemporary urban environments. Based on their highly mediatized lobbying, 
their followers in Senegal were estimated to count already more than 500,000 people in 2009 
(Samson-Ndaw, 2009: 149-150).  
                                                 
4
 The magazine Jeune Afrique ranked Serigne Mountakha Mbacké, the new Caliph of the Mourides since 
January 2018, as one of the 50 most influential figures on the African continent . Jeune Afrique, 7 May 2018, 
www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/553618/societe/les-50-africains-les-plus-influents-28-serigne-mountakha-mbacke/ 
(Guennoun, 2019: 17).  
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In view of the ever increasing use of modern media, like mobile phone and internet, the 
number of followers of the Islamic movements of late Marabout Sy, Mouride Mbacké and 
other religious leaders may have doubled in the meantime. Thus, the media became decisive 
also for the electoral campaign of the presidentials in 2019. Therefore, all admitted five 
candidates for the presidential of 2019 invested heavily in the digital field, notably in 
WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, Snapchat and other internet platforms, 
used by nearly 10 million, mostly young people, out of a population estimated at 16 million 
(Ciyow, 2019). This holds especially for the young and charismatic Ousmane Sonko, who, 
unburdened by the colonial heritage, even launched an online crowdfunding campaign that 
started already in 2017, called "Gift of myself for the Fatherland" to pay for his campaign. The 
operation tried to mobilize all possible fundraising platforms, including those of existing online 
banks in Senegal. But it applied also for the presidential candidate Idirissa Sall, leader of the 
Party of Unity and Assembling (PUR) who is a follower of the Tidianes. 
Hence, social online networks in Senegal were already hailed as ‘guardians of democracy’. 
Yet, the use of social media for the campaign increasingly runs the risk of being capitalized 
by adversaries too, including manipulation with fake news (Ciyow, 2019). Sonko, for 
example, had wanted to free himself from the powerful Sufi brotherhoods but then thought 
otherwise. Apparently, this unexpected political transhumance was not appreciated very 
much in a country that has always voted in the brotherhood triangle (Maillard, 2019). 
Moreover, he is one of the farouche opponents of the continuing dependence of Senegal on 
the Franc CFA and promised to leave the CFA-zone in case he should be elected. For a long 
time, voices in French-speaking African countries, reinforced since 2013 by the political 
columnist, lecturer and Pan-Africanist politician Kémi Séba, have risen for an exit from the 
CFA franc (see below). Today the discussion has become international and the UMOA and 
ECOWAS countries are officially organizing to discuss the modalities of an exit from the CFA 
zone and the creation of a common currency for the countries of the West African sub-
region. Y’en a marre rallies behind this movement. Apparently, this was not to the taste of the 
established political elite of Françafrique either, which might be one of the reasons why he 
was defeated by Macky Sall in the elections (VIP, 2019; Kohnert, 2019; see also the 
‘Conclusion’ for a more detailed analysis of the issues at stake). 
 
 
3. Y’en a marre, civic agency facing neocolonialism 
 
‘Y’en a marre’, (Enough is Enough, in French) has been created by a group of rappers and 
journalists in 2011 in the aftermath of the Arab Spring to denounce the societal and political 
problems in Senegal (Latuner, 2018). The movement which has remained active since the 
2012 presidential election, focusses on undertaking advocacy, monitoring and education on 
land reforms, constitutional reforms and electoral processes. It has been carried mainly by 
young activists, who took advantage of Wade's inauguration ceremony on 19 March 2011 to 
protest against President Wade's political excesses. They gained popularity during the June 
23, 2011 protests against Abdoulaye Wade's plan to allow his son Karim Wade to succeed 
him. In the following year, the movement was captured by several political parties, including 
the Alliance of Forces of Progress (AFP) of Moustapha Niasse. In the meantime, the 
movement has been emulated by Senegal’s civil society. It organized itself in many 
associations to defend their political demands, to control the good conduct of the last 
elections, to alert and stimulate the population to take their destiny in its own hands, to inform 
them about attempts of voter-manipulation, e.g. by buying votes by the distribution of money. 
10 
 
In general; they focused on grass-roots advocacy with the electorate on good governance 
and democracy. It can be assumed that the increase in voters turnout between 2012 and 
2019 (52% vs 66%, see above) is a consequence of these awareness campaigns to 
empower youth in their civic role. While the political commitment of young people remained 
predominantly male, young women also play in the score, confirming the results of analyses 
that present women engaged in civic agency e.g. in trade unions or in times of crisis, but 
paradoxically relatively absent from the spheres of political power. Their commitment is still 
limited to the role of "mobilizing force and propaganda" (Sylla 2001: 64). While the system 
legally allows for the presence of women in decision-making bodies, they continue to have 
difficult access into the patriarchal society that dominates Senegal (Sow 1997). In addition, 
women are little recognized by their peers when they get access to relevant political 
institutions (see the testimonials of Ngoné Ndoye, Awa Guèye Kébé and Aida Gaye in Dieng 
2017). Aside from continuing to advocate for their politically engaged husbands, career 
openings for women are found in trades requiring brilliant studies, societal and business 
engagement (PC interview 6 March 2019). The young activists allied with executives and 
intellectuals in proposing a break with the actual political system that in their view "has raged 
since independence" and that they consider as “neocolonialist" (interview IS, 22 January 
2019; see also Latuner, 2018:88-109). Thus, they adapted a discourse initiated already by 
Frantz Fanon in "Black skins white masks" some 60 year ago on the psychological effects of 
colonization and the human, social, and cultural consequences of decolonization, on their 
current social setting in a globalized world. ‘Y’en a marre’ calls for transparency in campaign 
budgets and applauds for example Ousmane Sonko’s initiative to create citizen funds by 
means of social media (see above). Formerly being inspector of taxes and estates, Sonko 
only recently became a political activist. A native of Thies, born in 1974, and student at the 
Gaston Berger University of Saint Louis, then Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar, he finally made his 
doctorate in Lyon in public and economic law. Thus, he represents the typical path of young 
and ambitious Senegalese academics. With his supporters he is considered to be honest, 
which, however, is strongly contested by his opponents. He grew up in the politically and 
geographically marginalized Casamance region in Southern Senegal, from where he got the 
mandate as a candidate for the presidential election. This singles him out of the stakes of his 
country, accustomed to a political class from the "4 communes", i.e. of the privileged 
Frankophone intelligentsia originating from the communes of St-Louis, Rufisque, Gorée and 
Dakar that granted French citizenship as early as 1916 to thank Senegal for its horrendous 
war efforts. The youth activist also believe that despite a general favourable image of the 
virtues of democracy in Senegal, in reality democracy as political system has been more and 
more abused. Irrespective of controversial debates around the corruption-trials of Karim 
Wade and Khalifa Sall that will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, the civil 
society, reinforced by NGOs, citizen movements and the political opposition, denounced the 
frequent ban of demonstrations and the brutalizing of citizens in duly registered events. Y’en 
a marre thus identify for example with Sonko’s visions on pertinent political solutions (Sonko, 
2018). That is, they long for a fresh socio-political antisystem that breaks with the caciques of 
Senegalese politics. A new system that proposes solutions to mismanagement and 
embezzlement, to the stranglehold on the economy by foreign powers, to poor governance 
and moral corruption not just of men but also of institutions in the country. It is all the more 
credible for this group of people that Sonko was ousted from his post at the Inspectorate 
General of Taxes and Domains in 2018 by presidential decree because he published a book 
on "Oil and Gas in Senegal: Chronicle of Spoliation". The book, which had been indexed by 
the government, sharply criticized the controversial management of oil and gas by the 
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Senegalese authorities and certain business circles of the corrupt network of Françafrique 
(Kohnert, 2019). Finally, the young people condemned the stranglehold of the economy of 
the country by foreigners, in particular of France, including Senegal’s submission to the 
‘outdated’ CFA Franc agreement. 
 
At the societal level, these young activists denounce the omnipresence of a political class 
that has reproduced itself in the same manner since independence. A system, which, despite 
the obvious modernization of Senegal and considerable, but not inclusive economic growth, 
keeps the people in a precarious situation where the health system, education and public 
transport are antiquated. Certainly, Macky Sall is acknowledged to have extended the 
possibilities of health insurance, the modernisation of some health centers - in particular by 
setting up dialysis facilities, or to have set up social assistance for the elderly poor families. 
But young people consider these changes minimal compared to the grand visions of the 
government’s long-term strategy, known as Blueprint ‘Sénégal Émergent‘ (PSE). The 
government has certainly increased the number of universities in Senegal. However, it did 
not ensure at the same time to raise the quality teachers and it ignored to improve the 
existing universities of Dakar and Saint-Louis. Last, but not least, Y’en a marre deplore the 
elevated youth unemployment rate of overall 14% (2015),  worsening the perspectives for 
young graduates who are likely to join the ranks of the informal sector, considering an 
underemployment-rate of only 34% of the population (males 27%, females 21%; Indicators of 
the labour market, Senegal Data portal, 2019). Moreover, these rates are distributed very 
disparately by region and gender. According to Professor Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, former Dean 
of the Faculty of Economics and Management (Faseg), Univ. of Dakar, estimates that the 
overall occupancy rate would be around 50%. 
 
For the last ten years now, this new generation of activists has become more and more 
politicized by taking an interest in the progress of their country and a globalized world. They 
protest by observing that some of the most miserable colonial countries in the 1950s have 
become emerging powers, while Senegal remains a poor country (IS interview of 23 
February.2019). Contrary to what they have been observing for decades, they want to take 
their destiny into their own hands. They are open to discuss all controversial issues with 
France, as Sonko maintained, but only if France accepts a dialogue between equals and 
listens to the arguments of the counterpart. Social networks are at work, in Senegal first, 
though one should not forget the considerable cleavages between city and province, but also 
trans-border networking in a globalized world. Globalized, they integrate with the movement 
of an Afro-centric attitude already thematised by ‘Afropolitanism’ (Awondo 2014; Mbembe; 
Abebe) or ‘Afrotopia’ (Felwine Sarr), i.e. certainly globalized but resolutely African. Thus it is 
not without reason, that the government has been very sceptical vis à vis this movement. In 
fact it tried to restrict its activities by investigating in alleged international funding of the 
network by INGOs. The investigation into Y’en a marre started only a few months before the 
elections, although the association has existed for years, which, according to amnesty 
international (ai), clearly indicates that the aim is to intimidate civil society groups ahead of 
the elections (AI, 2019). 
 
 
3. Justice and courts as 'stooges' of the president to eliminate 
competitors?  
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A central point in the controversial discussion of the 2019 presidentials was the barring of 
two major oppositional contenders, Karim Wade und Khalifa Sall, from the list of eligible 
candidates by the Constitutional Council because of criminal charges of corruption against 
them. Khalifa Sall had been alleged for misappropriation of public funds during his tenure as 
mayor of Dakar in 2017 and sentenced to five years' imprisonment and payment of five 
million FCFA (approximately EUR 7,630) on 3 January 2019. Already in March 2018 he was 
relieved of his position as mayor of Dakar and lost his mandate in parliament. Supporters of 
Khalifa Sall and his party (Parti Socialiste, PS) suspected that a politicized judiciary tried to 
disavow a serious rival of the president through false accusations (Volk, 2019:2). Karim 
Wade was not admitted to the election either, because he was sentenced on 23 March 2015, 
to six years in prison for alleged corruption during his time as a minister in his father's 
cabinet. In 2010, Karim Wade had amassed so many ministerial portfolios that he managed 
a quarter of Senegal's national budget (Dumont,2019: 64). In 2012, his father was defeated 
by Macky Sall in the second round of the presidentials 2012. This was explained by 
observers, last, but not least, because of the ambitions of the incumbent Abdoulaye Wade to 
install his son Karim as heir to his throne. However, this was strongly rejected as quasi-
monarchic insolence by the opposition (Dumont, 2019:34). In 2016 Karim Wade was 
surprisingly pardoned by President Macky Sall and fled into exile in Qatar. Yet, because of 
this conviction, the Constitutional Court did not recognise him as a legitimate candidate 
(Volk, 2019: 2). Incidentally, Macky Sall himself had been accused of money laundering as 
well during his tenure as prime minister of Abdoulaye Wade in 2007, however, the case was 
closed without conviction (Dumont, 2019:32). 
 
When opposition realized that they had been defeated by the incumbent already in the first 
round of the 2019 presidentials they did not even bother to contest the results before the 
highest Senegalese court. Obviously, it considered the Constitutional Council to be biased in 
favour of the acting president. And this not entirely without reason.  
 
A look in Senegal’s political history shows that its legal system is not beyond criticism. 
Apparently, the rule of law has been perceived by both the ordinary voter and the power elite 
less as an intangible third force within a system of separation of powers than as the reflection 
of a balance between forces, the nature of which can be modified according to 
circumstances. According to Assane Thiam, the country’s democracy is a sham and the rule 
of law constantly undermined (Thiam, 2007:145). This was underlined by Penda Mbow 
(2008) who holds that Senegal declined to the point of mere electoral authoritarianism. The 
strategic interest of the ruling party in a strong and independent constitutional review body 
was apparently low (Stroh & Heyl, 2015:181). 
 
Senegal's judiciary is divided and weakened. There coexist divers supreme courts, the 
Constitutional Council, which is in the first place an electoral court, a Council of State, a 
Court of Cassation, a Court of Accounts. All seven members of the Constitutional Council are 
appointed by the president of the republic, including two proposed by the president of the 
National Assembly, for six non-renewable years. They are partially renewed every two years 
with one or two new members.  
 
Senegal’s justice is frequently accused to be biased, and the servility of the Constitutional 
Council often denounced (Thiam, 2007: 152; Heyl, 2017). Whereas it is difficult to identify 
blatant misjudgement or interference with the executive, many magistrates anticipate in their 
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ruling the desires of the head of state out fear and submission (Thiam, 2007:152). Moreover, 
the consistency of rulings, i.e. that similar irregularities are answered with similar responses 
and sanctions which is crucial for the credibility of the judicial system (Heyl, 2017:48), has 
been apparently questioned by the opposition with respect to the conviction of the two 
oppositional candidates for corruption and embezzlement of funds and the subsequent 
annulation of their candidacy by the Constitutional Court. The problem is that in the way 
politics and budgets work in Senegal, the "black boxes" are part of everyday life. Even if 
Khalifa Sall should have used a slush fund in the Dakar City Hall, this apparently is seen by 
the voters to be customary at all levels of government. Now that the election results have 
been accepted, Y’en a marre has published its grievance book for the next five-year period 
when they will ask Macky Sall to step down from his party's (RPA) presidency in order to 
organize a transparent audit and credible electoral register as well as institutional reforms 
that guarantee in future inter alia the independence of justice5. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Whereas Senegal has long been – and apparently still is – for the Western world a showcase 
of democracy6, including peaceful political alternance as shown above, things have changed 
fundamentally with the Senegalese presidentials of 2019. In fact, academics recently 
predicted already the retreat of African democracy (Cheeseman, & Smith, 2019). As for 
Senegal, the presidentials of 2019 brought new configurations which demanded its toll. One 
of the major issues was political “transhumance that has been elevated to the rank of religion 
in defiance of morality” (Drame, 2012). It threatened political stability and peace, at least two 
activists were killed and several others hurt during campaign rallies that started on 4 
February 2019. Moreover, journalists were caught up in violence and pressures that were 
exerted on pro-democracy activists of Y’en marre  (ai, 2019) and many other civic 
organisations. Even though the elections were in general peaceful, and the announcement of 
the results did not provoke wide-spread violence on the streets, serious bloody clashes may 
have been prevented only thanks to the intervention of the Kahlife General des Mourides on 
February 24, 2019. 
 
Another major issue was the growing awareness both at the grass-roots and of oppositional 
leaders, like the young and charismatic Ousmane Sonko, for a peaceful liberation from F-
CFA domination of Senegal and to end ‘French monetary imperialism in Africa` (Sylla, 2018; 
Kohnert, 2019; Kohnert, 2005). In fact, the debate had begun already in October 2016, when 
a group of African and European economists published a book entitled Liberate Africa from 
Monetary Slavery: Who Profits from the CFA Franc? (Nubukpo et al, 2016). In the wake of 
the public debate sparked by this and similar publications (see also: Pigeaud et al, 2018), 
people began to speak out (Sylla, 2018). They were assisted by internationally renowned 
                                                 
5 Statement of Y’en a marre, televised on 5 March 2019 ( ; see also "The Daily” of 6 March 2019).  
6
 „South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, and Senegal are some of the countries that can showcase a  resistance to 
neo-patrimonialism through viable institutions, a history of political inclusivity, and smoother political transitions to 
democracy. … For example, there are also examples where violent contests or opposition's rejection of outcomes 
coincided with power transitions: the 1999 elections in Nigeria, Ghana's 2000 election, and Senegal's election in 
2001, thus favouring legitimacy and recurring transition over peaceful elections. “ Rocha & Khuon (2018:153, 155)  
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(former) African officials and critics of the F CFA franc, including Togo’s Kako Nubukpo (ex-
BCEAO and former Togolese Minister), Senegal’s Sanou Mbaye (ex-African Development 
Bank, and Guinea-Bissau’s Carlos Lopez (ex-UN Economic Commission for Africa), as well 
as African bankers like Henri-Claude Oyima (President-Director General of BGFI Bank). 
Since some years, a social movement developed to demand the withdrawal of African states 
from the F CFA. On 7 January 2017, for example, an NGO set up and run by the activist 
Kemi Séba, backed by ‘SOS Pan-Africa’, anti-CFA demonstrations were organized in several 
African and European cities (Sylla, 2018). In Senegal, the France Dégage group has been 
campaigning for the "monetary sovereignty" of the CFA countries (Lottersberger, 2018). 
However, the Senegalese economist Ndongo Samba Sylla deplored that the debate over the 
CFA franc has been too often restricted to the general pros and cons because, in reality, 
these are extremely unevenly distributed between social strata. The F CFA benefits mainly a 
small political and economic elite, both in France and Francophone Africa, as well as the 
managers of central banks and French companies (Lottersberger, 2018). Increasing support 
by the general public in Francophone African countries for leaving the F CFA zone was 
shown recently by a survey of Afrobarometer, published on 7 February 2019, taking the 
example of Togo. The survey revealed that two-thirds of the Togolese population were in 
favour of leaving the F CFA because the currency would benefit France more than Togo and 
should be replaced (Akinocho, 2019). In the meantime, a task force for an exit by 2020 has 
been established, even though a majority of heads of state of WAEMU continue to give their 
support to the CFA franc (Akinocho, 2019).  
The younger generations in Africa are no longer willing to let their future fly. This had been 
aptly demonstrated by the events of the Arab Spring in 2011, the revolts of 2014 in Burkina 
Faso, when Compaoré tried to seek a third mandate in disagreement with the constitution, by 
Senegalese Y’en a marre activists and the great demonstrations of Algiers today. Until now, 
people thought politics was the job of politicians. But things have changed. Peoples realized 
that their identity and voter's card respectively can interfere with their own future and that of 
their country, which has been demonstrated last but not least by the unprecedented increase 
in the voters turnout in Senegal between 2012 and 2019 shown above. 
Macky Sall who was re-elected "without glory" (Sonko, 1 March 2019) quiets the game by 
responding positively to the demands of civil society. Thus, he supported the demand by the 
leader of the civic election observation group ‘Sunu Election’, Babacar Gueye for a political 
dialogue between government and the opposition. The Senegalese youth who found in 
Sonko its leader, is ready to play the game. The next challenge will be the communal 
elections in December.  
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